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Abstract
Subjective experience indicates that mental states are discrete, in the sense that memories and perceptions readily come to
mind in some cases, but are entirely unavailable to awareness in others. However, a long history of psychophysical research
has indicated that the discrete nature of mental states is largely epiphenomenal and that mental processes vary
continuously in strength. We used a novel combination of behavioral methodologies to examine the processes underlying
perception of complex images: (1) analysis of receiver operating characteristics (ROCs), (2) a modification of the change-
detection flicker paradigm, and (3) subjective reports of conscious experience. These methods yielded converging results
showing that perceptual judgments reflect the combined, yet functionally independent, contributions of two processes
available to conscious experience: a state process of conscious perception and a strength process of knowing; processes that
correspond to recollection and familiarity in long-term memory. In addition, insights from the perception experiments led to
the discovery of a new recollection phenomenon in a long-term memory change detection paradigm. The apparent
incompatibility between subjective experience and theories of cognition can be understood within a unified state-strength
framework that links consciousness to cognition across the domains of perception and memory.
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Introduction
Many of life’s experiences are associated with qualitatively
distinct mental states. When trying to remember our past, we can
consciously recollect qualitative details about some events, and yet
have little or no recollection for other important events [1–4].
When inspecting two very similar photographs, we may be acutely
aware of a difference between the two, yet in other cases, fail to
notice even pronounced differences [5–7]. These examples suggest
that some conscious experiences are discrete, and either occur or
fail to occur. Yet, a dominant view of cognition is that the
appearance of discrete mental states is an epiphenomenon, and
cognition in reality varies in a completely continuous manner, such
that some memories are simply stronger than others, or some
perceptual differences just more noticeable than others ([8–12],
but see [13–14]).
Recent advances in memory research have suggested that pure
strength theories may be insufficient, which has led to the
development of theories that incorporate both state and strength
processes [3–4; 15–17]. One such theory [3] proposes that in
addition to memories that vary continuously in strength, some
memories are associated with a discrete mental state. Thus, a given
memory judgment can be based on continuously graded
information about an event’s familiarity; alternatively, it can be
based on the ability to recollect qualitative information about a prior
event such as when or where an item was studied, a process that
will either occur or fail to occur. The specific information that is
recollected or the strength of that information can vary, but most
critically, for some items recollection completely fails.
Here, we expand on this approach to propose a general theory of
cognition, in which state and strength processes combine indepen-
dently to support conscious experience in perception and memory
(Fig. 1).Ourclaim is that pure strength theories of cognition provide
an insufficient account of perception and memory. We describe a
series of experiments which show that although there are conditions
under which strength theories work quite well, a full account of
perception and memory must include both state and strength
processes. In perception, a state process of perceiving, similar to
recollection (or remembering [2]) in memory, provides qualitative,
high-resolution information to conscious awareness, but it can often
fail entirely. An independent strength process of knowing, similar to
familiarity (or knowing [2]) in memory, provides a quantitative, low-
resolution global matching signal. Thus, memory judgments can be
based on the recollection of qualitative information about a prior
event or on assessments of familiarity, and, similarly, perceptual
judgments can be based on the perception of detailed sensory
information or on an overall match signal.
In the current work, we first explore the conditions under which
strength theories are successful, and other conditions in which
both state and strength processes are needed to account for
perception. We then examine whether state and strength processes
are functionally distinct by testing whether they can be doubly
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e30231dissociated, whether they exhibit distinct temporal onsets and
whether they are associated with different kinds of subjective
experiences and sensory information. Finally, we use insights
gleaned from state-strength theory in perception to test novel
predictions about long-term memory.
Results
Investigating when perceiving and knowing contribute
to perception
Support for strength theories of perception has come from
studies that were designed so that stimuli are ‘just noticeable’ [13],
typically by using simple stimuli that are rapidly presented and
often immediately masked. One major advantage of this approach
is that it affords tight experimental control which greatly simplifies
the interpretation of the results. A potential disadvantage of this
approach, however, is that the results from these studies may not
generalize to real-world perception of more complex materials.
Most importantly, we suggest that these data-limited conditions
might reduce the contribution of conscious perception [18], and
thus they may tell us only half of the story, providing insights about
knowing but little insights about perceiving. We therefore tested
the prediction that under standard data-limited conditions, per-
ceptual discriminations would be consistent with the dominant
strength theory, but that perception of more complex, realistic
images would additionally involve a state of conscious perception.
To test these ideas, the first experiment examined perceptual
discriminations for simple stimuli made under standard psycho-
physical test conditions [12–13] (Fig. 2A; Movie S1). Individuals
were shown pairs of rapidly-presented lines and made same/
different confidence judgments. The confidence judgments were
used to plot receiver operating characteristics (ROCs [19]; Fig. 1)
and estimate the contributions of state and strength processes by
using curve-fitting algorithms [3,17]. The ROCs were curvilinear
and fit virtually perfectly by pure strength theory [11,20–21]
(Fig. 2C). Model fits to the average ROCs verified that judgments
were based on a strength process, knowing, with essentially no
evidence for states of conscious perception [Perceiving sameness
(Ps)=0, Perceiving difference (Pd)=0, Knowing (K)=0.97].
Parameter estimates based on individuals’ ROCs (Fig. 2C, inset)
supported the same conclusions.
To investigate perceptual discrimination of realistic images, the
next experiment utilized buildings, faces, and fractals (Fig. 2B;
Movie S2). The images were either identical or differed in that one
image was slightly expanded or contracted relative to the other.
On every trial, individuals were presented with an image for
1500 ms, which was then masked and followed by the second
image for a same/different confidence judgment. The ROCs for
these perceptual judgments (Fig. 2D) were curvilinear, indicating
the contribution of knowing; but most critically, the ROCs now
intercepted the top x-axis, showing the contribution of a state
process in which individuals were able to perceive when there was
a difference between the images. Model fits to the average ROCs
verified that judgments were based on perceiving differences
(Pd=0.31, 0.36, and 0.32, for buildings, faces, and fractals,
respectively) and on assessments of knowing (K=0.76, 0.68, and
1.11 for buildings, faces, and fractals, respectively). In addition, the
y-intercept was effectively zero, indicating that the state of
perceiving did not support identification of sameness (Ps=0 for
all conditions). Parameter estimates based on individuals’ ROCs
(Fig. 2D, inset) led to the same conclusions.
The conditions in which perceiving and knowing jointly
contribute to performance were examined across four additional
experiments, which indicated that the pattern of results was robust.
In the first of these experiments (Movie S3), the first image was
presented very briefly (i.e. 300 ms) and the second image was
presented immediately afterward (i.e. a 0 delay, with no
intervening mask). The second image was shifted slightly to
remove transient motion cues that would otherwise appear on
‘different’ but not ‘same’ trials. Here, too, both perceiving and
knowing contributed to performance (Fig. 2E). The same pattern
of results held when the two images were presented simultaneously
for 1500 ms (Movie S4 and Fig. 2F) and when they were presented
simultaneously for 180 ms, a duration that is too brief for
voluntary saccades to be made (Fig. 2G). Finally, we used arrays
of six objects, one of which could potentially change. In one
condition, the objects were trial-unique, while in the other
condition, a set of twenty objects was repeated in different
combinations of six on each trial (Movie S5 and Fig. 2H). Again, in
Figure 1. Illustration of state-strength theory. Probability density
functions (top) for evidence that stimuli come from class A or B (e.g., old
or new items in a test of memory; pairs of same or different images in a
test of perception). Classic strength theory postulates continuously-
varying evidence distributions for items in different classes (normal
distributions for A and B). In contrast, state-strength theory proposes
that in addition to continuously-varying distributions, items may elicit
discrete mental states (uniform distributions for A and B). Predicted
receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) are shown on the bottom.
ROCs plot the proportion of correct and incorrect responses across
different levels of evidence strength. Strength theory predicts
curvilinear ROCs with intercepts at (0,0) and (1,1). However, if some
items are associated with a discrete mental state, the ROC intercepts
will be shifted so that the left y-intercept occurs at a point
corresponding to State A and the upper x-intercept occurs at a point
corresponding to State B. The resulting ROC reflects a combination of
state and strength processes. Parameter estimates in the inset show
estimates of state and strength for these hypothetical ROCs. State and
strength processes are, respectively, recollection and familiarity in
memory, and perceiving and knowing in perception.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030231.g001
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e30231Figure 2. Perception of simple and complex visual images. (A–B) Trial procedures and materials for the first series of experiments. (C–H) ROCs
and estimates of Perceiving Same (Ps, the y-intercept), Perceiving Different (Pd, one minus the upper x-intercept) and Knowing (K, the degree of
curvilinearity, measured as d9). Average parameter estimates from individuals’ ROCs are in the insets; error bars show the standard error of the mean.
Perception of simple stimuli (C; trial procedure shown in A) could be accounted for by the strength process of knowing, while perception of complex
stimuli such as buildings, faces and fractals (D; trial procedure shown in B) was based on knowing as well as a state of perceiving differences.
Subsequent experiments indicated that the results with complex stimuli generalized to different presentation conditions and stimuli, including (E)
sequentially presented images without an intervening mask, (F) simultaneously presented images, (G) simultaneously presented images at a duration
too brief for eye movements to occur, and (H) arrays of six objects that were either trial-unique or repeated in different combinations over trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030231.g002
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performance.
Thus, across a range of different stimuli and presentation
conditions, perceiving and knowing contributed to same/different
judgments of complex images. Perceiving supported the identifi-
cation of difference but not sameness, indicating that the
perception of a difference is highly diagnostic that images are
different, while the perception of similarities between two complex
images is not diagnostic that they are identical.
These findings are consistent with the claim that perception of
realistic images relies on the contribution of two separate
processes. But it is not clear from these data whether perceiving
and knowing make independent contributions to performance, or
if they are reducible to high- and low-strength perceptions,
respectively, on a single underlying strength continuum. If these
processes are in fact independent, it should be possible to find a
manipulation that affects them in opposite directions.
Functional independence of perceiving and knowing
The predictions for the next experiment were motivated by
theories of memory, which propose that the state process of
recollection is associated with access to qualitative details about a
prior event, while the strength process of familiarity reflects an
assessment of global match between a current event and
information in memory [4]. If this extends to perception, the
state of perceiving should be associated with access to qualitative
details, whereas knowing should be associated with assessments of
global match.
We therefore contrasted conditions that varied the degree of
global match between images. Each image was altered to form a
pair of images that differed in a global manner and a pair of images
that differed in a discrete manner. Different individuals took part in
theglobalchangeconditionand the discretechangecondition.Theglobal
change condition utilized the types of changes from the prior
experiments in which an image was contracted slightly to form one
version and expanded slightly to form the other. In contrast, in the
discrete change condition, a single feature was added or removed to
form the other version of the image (Fig. 3A). In the discrete change
condition, the overall perceptual match between ‘different’ stimuli is
quite high, so a knowing signal based on global match should not be
very useful for detecting differences. In contrast, if individuals
perceive the specific, qualitative detail that differs between the two
images, the images can be identified as different. In the global
change condition on the other hand, an overall global match signal
willbe usefulsincetheimagesarethe same ordifferentovermuch of
their extent.
The aim was to examine the differential contributions of
perceiving and knowing under conditions in which the discrete
and global discriminations were equally difficult, in the sense that
overall performance is matched for these different types of
discriminations. Under these conditions, perceiving should be
higher for discrete compared to global changes, and knowing
should be higher for global compared to discrete changes. It is
important to note that these conditions are not expected to be
process-pure; that is, both discrete and global change conditions
should be associated with contributions from both perceiving and
knowing. The critical prediction is that the relative contributions of
these processes can be doubly dissociated, so that perceiving makes
a relatively larger contribution in the discrete change condition,
and knowing makes a relatively larger contribution in the global
change condition.
In line with predictions, this manipulation led to crossover
dissociations in the ROCs and in the parameter estimates (Fig. 3B).
Discrete changes were associated with a larger contribution of
perceiving than global changes, and global changes were
associated with higher levels of knowing than discrete changes.
This double dissociation cannot be attributed simply to differences
in strength, because difficulty was matched; rather, it indicates that
there must be two functionally independent components under-
lying performance.
Figure 3. Dissociating perceiving and knowing. (A) Examples of global (left) and discrete (right) changes. Buildings were expanded or
contracted slightly in the global change condition. A feature was added or removed in the discrete change condition (arrows were not presented in
the experiment). The trial procedure was the same as in Fig. 2B. (B) ROCs and parameter estimates revealed a crossover dissociation; Pd was
significantly greater for discrete compared to global changes [t(36)=3.15, p=.003], while K was significantly greater for global compared to discrete
changes [t(36)=2.68, p=.01]. Ps did not differ, t,1. (C) Average quadratic coefficients of ROCs plotted in z-space; error bars show the standard error
of the mean. Global change zROCs did not differ significantly from linearity [left global bar, Mquadratic=20.12, SE=0.06, t(18)=1.84, p=.08; right
global bar, Mquadratic=20.04, SE=0.05, t,1, ns], whereas discrete change zROCs were U-shaped, i.e. had significant positive quadratic components
[from left to right, Mquadratic=0.30, SE=0.09, t(17)=3.19, p=.005; Mquadratic=0.39, SE=0.16, t(5)=2.43, p=.05; Mquadratic=0.15, SE=0.06, t(21)=2.48,
p=.022; Mquadratic=0.21, SE=0.08, t(18)=2.57, p=.019;], ruling against a UVSD strength theory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030231.g003
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still be possible if ‘different’ trials are associated with greater
variability in matching strength than ‘same’ trials. We assessed this
unequal variance signal detection theory (UVSD; [16]) by examining
ROCs plotted in z-space (zROCs). The UVSD theory predicts
linear zROCs, while state-strength theory predicts U-shaped
zROCs when performance is driven by a state process. In line with
the latter, zROCs in the global change condition did not deviate
significantly from linearity, but zROCs in the discrete change
condition exhibited a significant U-shape (Fig.3C, first experi-
ment). Moreover, in all of the subsequent experiments that
included global and discrete changes (see below), discrete change
zROCs were consistently U-shaped, whereas the global change
zROCs were not (Fig. 3C). The U-shaped zROCs verify the a priori
prediction of state-strength theory and are inconsistent with the
strength-only UVSD theory.
Measuring perceiving and knowing across time
If perceiving is a discrete mental state, it should be possible to
find situations in which perceiving has a relatively sudden
temporal onset. Individuals may therefore show abrupt transitions
from a state of not perceiving into a state of perceiving. In the
current tasks, where the detection of any difference is diagnostic
that images are different, perceiving should have a sudden onset
when a critical difference between two images is identified. In
contrast, if knowing is a strength process based on global match,
then the strength of this signal should increase gradually as
additional information is accumulated over time.
In the next experiment, we contrasted a condition associated
primarily with perceiving (i.e. discrete changes) to a condition
associated with both perceiving and knowing (i.e. global changes).
The former should show mostly ‘step function’ transitions for
‘different’ trials, in which individuals show relatively abrupt
transitions from a state of being unsure to a state of high-
confidence correct information (i.e. perceiving). In contrast, the
latter condition should show both step function transitions and
more gradual transitions from low to intermediate and then to
high confidence (i.e. knowing). For both conditions, ‘same’ trials
should show primarily gradual transitions, consistent with the
previous findings that perceiving does not contribute significantly
to the identification of sameness.
To test these predictions, we used a modification of the flicker
paradigm [6] which allowed confidence judgments to be tracked
over repeated exposures to a given pair of images (Movie S6). Each
trial consisted of ten repetitions of a pair of either ‘same’ or
‘different’ images. The differences were discrete or global, for
different individuals. Following each of the ten presentations of
each pair, individuals made a same/different confidence response
on a 9-point scale.
Fig. 4A–B shows confidence ratings across the image repetitions.
When the two images in a pair were different (top row of blocks in
Fig.4A and B), a majority of trials exhibited a discrete step
function, in which responses abruptly transitioned to the highest-
confidence ‘different’ response in a transition of two or more steps
in confidence [M(SE) was 67(3)% and 56(8)% of ‘different’ trials
for discrete and global changes, respectively]. In contrast, when
the two images were the same (bottom row of blocks in Fig.4A and
B), step functions were significantly less likely [11(7)%, t(9)=7.46,
p,.001 for discrete changes, and 29(8)%, t(9)=3,45, p=.007 for
global changes]. Instead, the majority of ‘same’ trials that obtained
a high confidence ‘same’ response [47(12)% and 65(10)% of all
‘same’ trials for discrete and global changes, respectively], were
associated with gradual transitions from low to intermediate and
then to high confidence [36(10)% and 36(8)% of all ‘same’ trials
for discrete and global changes, respectively], and this did not
differ for discrete and global changes [t(18)=.02, ns]. Moreover,
gradual identification of differences was more likely to occur for
global compared to discrete changes [25(7)% and 6(3)% of
‘different’ trials for global and discrete changes, respectively,
t(18)=2.60, p=.018]. Thus, perceiving differences can be
supported by a process that onsets abruptly, whereas detection
of similarity is based on a process that builds more gradually. In
addition, when changes in a scene are global rather than discrete,
there is gradual learning of differences as well as similarities.
To assess whether step function and gradual transition trials
reflected perceiving and knowing, respectively, we examined the
relationship between these trial types and estimates of perceiving
and knowing derived from an ROC analysis. The proportion of
‘different’ trials in which high-confidence responses appeared
suddenly was correlated with ROC estimates of perceiving
difference (Fig. 5A), whereas the proportion of gradual transition
trials was correlated with ROC estimates of knowing (Fig. 5B).
Importantly, the converse correlations were not statistically
significant; step function transitions were not significantly correlated
with ROC estimates of knowing, and gradual transitions were not
significantly correlated with estimates of perceiving, both ps..2.
These findings suggest that perceiving is a discrete mental state that
onsets suddenly, while knowing is a continuously graded mental
process that builds gradually over time.
The sudden onset of perceiving compared to knowing suggests
that as more features of the images are sampled, individuals tend to
suddenly notice differences between paired images. However, once
a difference is noticed, could a simple strength process account for
performance?Toassessthis,weexaminedROCsforeachrepetition
within a trial. Inconsistent with a strength account, discrete changes
produced relatively linear ROCs at all levels of performance
(Fig. 6A). Moreover, the global change ROCs were found to be
consistently curvilinear and had an intercept at the top x-axis
(Fig. 6C), indicative of performance supported by both perceiving
and knowing across levels of performance. Parameter estimates
confirmed that the discrete change condition was supported more
by perceiving than knowing, while the global change condition was
associated with both perceiving and knowing (Fig. 6A and C, insets).
Finally, replicating and extending the findings from the first global/
discrete experiment (see Fig.3C),thezROCsforthediscretechange
condition were consistently U-shaped (Fig. 6B) while the global
change zROCs were not (Fig. 6D).
Conscious awareness of perceiving and knowing
In the previous experiments, perceiving and knowing were
inferred from the ROCs and learning functions. In order to assess
whether perceiving and knowing reflect distinct subjective
experiences accessible to conscious awareness, we developed a
perceive/know paradigm, inspired by the remember/know paradigm
in studies of memory [2]. In the remember/know paradigm,
individuals introspect on their subjective experiences while making
recognition judgments. ‘Remember’ responses are given when
individuals recollect specific details about where or when an event
was encountered before, while ‘know’ responses are given when
individuals experience something as familiar but are not able to
retrieve details about the episode in which it was initially seen.
Similarly, in the current study, perceive was defined as being
consciously aware of specific, qualitative details that serve as a
basis for responding, while know was defined as ‘just knowing’ that
images were either different or the same, but not being able to
provide any specific details about why.
In the current experiment, we examined the detection of discrete
changes, since these types of changes are the most amenable to the
Bridging Consciousness and Cognition
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es. On every trial, individuals gave confidence responses to pairs of
buildings, and then introspectedo nt h e i rs u b j e c tive perceptual
experiences to provide a perceive/know report. Confidence responses
were used to plot ROCs to yield estimates of perceiving and knowing,
and these estimates were compared to the subjective reports of
perceiving and knowing. If perceiving and knowing, as measured in
the ROCs, are psychologically real in the sense that they are available
to subjective experience, there should be a direct relationship between
the ROC estimates and subjective reports of conscious experience. As
predicted, we found a strong positive correlation between the ROC
estimates and estimates from subjective reports (Fig. 7A–B, first
experiment), showing that perceiving and knowing are associated with
phenomenologically distinct experiences.
To determine whether subjective reports of perceiving are
associated with conscious access to veridical information [22],
another group of individuals completed the perceive/know
experiment, but additionally reported the aspect of each image
that had been altered when a ‘different’ response was given.
Replicating the previous experiment, there was a close correspon-
dence between the ROC estimates and subjective estimates of
perceiving and of knowing (Fig.7A–B, second experiment).
Importantly, the proportion of trials in which individuals correctly
identified the specific detail that had changed was significantly
correlated with ROC estimates of perceiving, r=0.57, p,.01, but
was not significantly correlated with estimates of knowing, r=0.24,
ns. Moreover, for the ‘different’ trials leading to a ‘perceive
different’ response (proportion=0.29), in almost every case (0.26),
individuals correctly identified the specific detail that had changed.
In contrast, for the ‘different’ trials leading to a ‘know different’
response (0.25), individuals were just as likely to provide incorrect
details (0.06) as correct details (0.06), and were twice as likely to
provide no detail at all (0.13). Thus, when conscious perception
occurs, individuals accurately report the specific detail that was
altered, whereas when responses are based on knowing, this ability
is absent or reduced.
Figure 4. Tracking perceiving and knowing over time. Same/different confidence responses across repetitions for each trial in the flicker
paradigm. Data are shown for the ten individuals (numbers on top of each column of blocks) tested in the discrete change condition (A) and the ten
individuals tested in the global change condition (B). ‘Different’ trials are the top row of blocks for each of the discrete and global change conditions;
‘same’ trials are the bottom row of blocks for each condition. Trials are sorted so that the fastest learning trials appear on the bottom of each block. In
each block, every row is a trial, and the x-axis represents responses 1 through 10. Unsure responses are green, hotter colors indicate more confident
‘different’ responses; cooler colors indicate more confident ‘same’ responses. In the discrete change condition, the correct identification of differences
showed an abrupt, step function transition to high confidence responses. In contrast, in the global change condition, the correct identification of
differences showed step function transitions on some trials and more gradual transitions on other trials. The identification of sameness gradually
transitioned from low to intermediate to high confidence for both conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030231.g004
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reports of familiarity may sometimes be associated with recollec-
tion of qualitative information, and, conversely, that subjective
reports of recollection may be given even when events are only
familiar [23,24]. Might this ‘contamination’ criticism apply here,
for reports of perceiving and knowing? We would not argue that
subjective reports of perceiving and knowing are process pure, but
several aspects of the current results indicate that reports of
perceiving were relatively uncontaminated by knowing. For
example, memory research has shown that when careful
instructions are given to individuals [23,25], such contamination
is minimized. In the current studies, we were careful to provide
individuals with strict instructions; namely, that ‘perceive’
responses should only be given if a verbal description that justifies
the response can be provided. In addition, while ROC and
subjective report estimates of perceiving (and knowing) correlated
highly, there was no significant correlation between ROC
estimates of perceiving and subjective reports of knowing, or
ROC estimates of knowing and subjective reports of perceiving (all
ps..16). If reports of perceiving and/or knowing were contam-
inated, one would predict to see significant correlations between
reports of perceiving and ROC estimates of knowing, and likewise
with reports of knowing and ROC estimates of perceiving. Finally,
the results from the detail reports suggest that subjective reports of
perceiving and knowing are associated with access to qualitatively
different kinds of information.
Using insights from perception to reveal recollection of
items not previously studied: A long-term memory
change detection paradigm
The current state-strength theory was motivated by a theory of
long-term memory [3], but the perception results are quite
different from those seen in studies of memory in an important
way. That is, in studies of item recognition memory, observed
ROCs are invariably found to be curvilinear with a y-intercept
[16], rather than an upper x-intercept, as observed in the
perception studies reported here. These results suggest that in
memory, the state process of recollection supports the identifica-
tion of oldness (i.e. that a test item is the same as a studied item),
whereas in perception, the state process of perceiving supports
identification of newness (i.e. that items are different from one
another). Why would the state processes in memory and
perception, and the resulting ROCs, differ in this way?
We propose that the reason is that the detection of similarities
and differences tend to play opposite roles in memory and
perception. That is, in perceptual tasks, noticing even a small
change between two images is sufficient to make a definitive
‘different’ response. On the other hand, noticing similarities
between two very similar, complex images is not definitive
evidence that they are identical, as there may be differences that
were simply not noticed. Thus, in these perceptual tasks, one
expects the state of perceiving to support the detection of
difference (i.e. an upper x-intercept) rather than the detection of
sameness. In recognition memory tasks, on the other hand, the test
list typically contains a mixture of multiple studied items and
multiple items that are completely new to the experiment. Under
these conditions, recollecting that a test item is the same as a
studied item is quite useful in making a recognition judgment, and
this will produce a positive y-intercept. In contrast, failing to
recollect a test item is not particularly diagnostic; recollection may
have failed not because the item is new, but because the item was
not adequately encoded at study or it was forgotten over the delay.
The only way one could recollect that a test item was not in the
study list is if one could remember every one of the studied items
and by a process of elimination reject the test item as new. Thus, in
recognition memory tasks, one expects the state of recollection to
support the detection of oldness (i.e. a y-intercept) rather than the
detection of newness.
If this account is correct, it should be possible to observe a state
process in memory that supports recollection of newness, and
eliminate the use of recollecting oldness, if we could find a set of
conditions under which memory for newness becomes diagnostic.
To this end, we chose to try to make the recollection of newness
diagnostic in memory in the same way that the perception of
difference was useful in the current perceptual tests. That is, rather
than having the test list made up of distinct study and test items,
we designed an experiment in which the test list was made up of
studied items and very similar items that had been modified in
some subtle way, similar to the discrete change condition in the
earlier perception experiments (see Fig. 8A). We predicted that
under these conditions, recollection that something had changed
between study and test would be diagnostic, which would lead to
an upper x-intercept reflecting the contribution of recollection of
Figure 5. Relating step functions and gradual transitions to perceiving and knowing. (A) ROC estimates of perceiving were highly
correlated with the proportion of step function transitions, r=.898, p,.001. (B) ROC estimates of knowing were highly correlated with the proportion
of gradual transitions (right), r=.814, p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030231.g005
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of oldness would no longer be diagnostic that the test image is
identical to the studied image in every way, because there may
have been differences that were not noticed. The y-intercept
should now approach zero, indicating that recollection of oldness
is no longer useful. As far as we know, no study of recognition
memory has ever shown this pattern of results [16]; however, the
contributions of recollection and familiarity in a long-term
memory change detection paradigm have never been examined.
To test these ideas, we first examined standard long-term item
recognition for the buildings used in the previous perception
studies. Individuals studied a series of buildings, and at test, were
shown a list of old, studied buildings randomly intermixed with
entirely new, unstudied buildings. Confidence judgments at test
were used to plot ROCs. In line with prior long-term memory
research [16], we found that the ROCs were asymmetrical with a
positive y-intercept, indicating recollection of old, but not new,
items (Fig. 8B, standard long-term recognition ROC).
A separate group of individuals studied a list of complex scenes
and were tested on their memory for scenes that were either
presented exactly as studied, or were changed so that elements
were either added or removed (Fig. 8A and Movie S7). Here,
identification of any difference is diagnostic that the scene is
different (i.e. new), but identification of similarities is not diagnostic
that the image is exactly the same (i.e. old). In contrast to standard
item recognition, the resulting memory ROCs were now shaped
like perception ROCs, indicating that individuals recollected new
items as new, but did not recollect old items as old (Fig. 8B, long-
term memory change detection ROC). Importantly, overall
performance in the two recognition tests was matched, such that
the ROCs crossed over. Thus the differences in shape cannot be
attributed to differences in overall memory strength. The discovery
of this new memory phenomenon (long-term change detection, or
recollection of newness) reveals the utility of adopting a unified
theoretical model (i.e. state-strength theory) of both perception and
memory.
Figure 6. ROCs and zROCs over time. ROCs (left) and zROCs (right) were plotted for the discrete (top row) and global (bottom row) change
conditions for each of the ten responses in the flicker paradigm. Average estimates of perceiving and knowing are in the insets of the ROCs; error bars
show the standard error of the mean. The discrete change ROCs (A) were consistently linear, and the resulting zROCs (B) were U-shaped. The global
change ROCs (C) were curvilinear with an upper x-intercept, and the zROCs (D) did not deviate from linearity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030231.g006
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Together, these experiments provide evidence that there is no
incompatibility between the discrete nature of subjective experi-
ence and the continuous phenomena that are often examined in
studies of memory and perception. The general theoretical
framework proposed here suggests that both state and strength
processes make independent contributions to perception and
memory. We found that perceptual judgments are supported by a
discrete state of perceiving that becomes available relatively
abruptly, and a sense of knowing that increases gradually over
time. As with studies of recollection and familiarity in long-term
memory [4], perceiving and knowing were functionally indepen-
dent and available to conscious awareness. Moreover, as with
recollection, when conscious perception occurred, it was associat-
ed with accurate access to qualitative details.
Whether this theoretical approach proves useful in other
cognitive domains remains to be tested, but there is reason to be
optimistic that it might be quite general. For example, in studies of
working memory, state models assuming a fixed memory capacity
[26] and strength models assuming a large capacity [27–28] have
been proposed, and each has found considerable empirical
support. A hybrid model that incorporates both state and strength
processes might allow for an integration of these two approaches
[29]. In the visual attention literature, a controversial proposal has
been that detecting changes in visual scenes may be supported by a
process of sensing a change in the absence of conscious experience,
or by conscious visual experience of qualitative information about
Figure 7. Subjective availability of perceiving and knowing. Correlations between ROC estimates and subjective reports of perceiving (A) and
knowing (B). There was a positive correlation between ROC estimates and subjective reports of perceiving differences [Pd, r=.87, p,.001; r=.82,
p,.001 for the first and second experiments, respectively] and of knowing [r=.67, p,.001; r=.79, p,.001 for the first and second experiments,
respectively].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030231.g007
Figure 8. Generalizing from perception to long-term memory. (A) Example of a scene from the long-term memory change detection
paradigm. In the example shown here, the bottom image is missing a few items that are present in the top image, including the keyboard, the
mouse, and the wall outlets. (B) ROCs in long-term memory change detection and in a performance-matched standard recognition memory
procedure. Change detection compared to standard recognition led to an increase in recollection of new items [Rn; t(52)=5.37, p,.001] and a
decrease in the recollection of old items [Ro; t(52)=4.67, p,.001] whereas estimates of familiarity did not differ [F; t,1]. Average parameter estimates
are in the inset in (B); error bars show the standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030231.g008
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on pre-attentive visual processes that allow access to low-level
object information, and attentional mechanisms that form
coherent conscious percepts, respectively [6,32–33]. Determining
how these attentional processes are related to the processes of
knowing and perceiving awaits future studies.
The current findings suggest that a single theoretical framework
– state-strength theory – is able to account well for the results from
both perception and memory. We believe that finding such a
unifying framework is an important theoretical advance that
informs the understanding of memory and of perception. It tells us
that at some fundamental level, both memory and perception can
be characterized as reflecting a combination of state and strength
processes. The ability to take insights from memory and apply
them to perception, and then in turn to take insights from
perception and apply them to memory tells us that this framework
is quite useful. This does not, however, imply that the state and
strength processes in perception are identical to those in memory.
We expect that they are quite different, and future work that aims
to examine how they do differ will be informative.
That perceiving and knowing make independent contributions
to perception has important implications for researchers investi-
gating the neural basis of complex perceptual discriminations. For
example, memory research has shown that recollection and
familiarity have distinct neural substrates [see 34 for review]. It
seems reasonable that perceiving and knowing may likewise have
distinct neural underpinnings. This possibility remains to be
explored in patient and neuroimaging work. We suspect that
qualitative differences in how the brain supports perceptual
judgments will be overlooked if one does not take into account
the distinction between perceiving and knowing.
Comparison to alternative theoretical frameworks
The current theoretical approach differs in important ways from
other accounts of perception and memory. As discussed earlier, a
dominant approach has been to treat perception and memory as
reflecting the assessment of a single underlying strength continuum
[8–12]. In the current studies, we show that this dominant
approach is inadequate when one examines perception of
complex, realistic images. This does not imply that this approach
is not useful in some situations; indeed, under standard
psychophysical test conditions [13] this theory does extremely
well, suggesting that in data-limited situations, performance can be
based largely on a simple strength process. What our results do
show is that this approach is insufficient when one moves beyond
the realm of rapidly-presented, masked, simple stimuli. Perception
of more realistic images depends on a combination of state and
strength processes. Thus, there are important differences between
perception of real-world images and perception in the kinds of
data-limited conditions traditionally used in laboratory psycho-
physics experiments. A pure strength theory cannot explain the
double dissociations observed in the global/discrete experiments,
the distinct patterns of confidence transitions over time, the
different conscious experiences available to awareness, or the
different types of information that are accessible when perceiving
and knowing occur. Thus, these findings show that pure strength
theories are not sufficient when rich, ecologically valid stimuli are
the objects of perception.
State-strength theory is also distinct from several models that
have focused on the distinction between conscious and uncon-
scious processes [18,35–36]. Although the current approach
recognizes as fundamental the distinction between conscious
perception/recollection on the one hand and knowing/familiarity
on the other, it treats the conscious/unconscious distinction as
more of a continuum than a true dichotomy [18]. That is,
perceiving and knowing are associated with different kinds of
consciousness, rather than the presence or absence of conscious
experience. Perceiving carries with it consciousness of what has
changed, while knowing may only be associated with conscious-
ness that there has been a change. This distinction is related to that
between phenomenal and access consciousness [37]. Knowing is
associated with phenomenal consciousness (namely, an experience
of perceptual similarity or difference) but not access consciousness
- specific details are not available for verbal report. Perceiving, on
the other hand, is associated with both phenomenal and access
consciousness.
Just as perceiving and knowing are associated with different
kinds of consciousness, recollection and familiarity in memory are
related to different types of conscious experiences. Recollection is
accompanied by autonoetic, or ‘self-knowing’ consciousness, while
familiarity is accompanied by noetic, or ‘knowing’ consciousness
[2]. Here, too, the distinction between state and strength processes
does not map directly on to conscious and unconscious processes,
respectively, but rather different kinds of consciousness.
Future directions
The studies reported here suggest a number of important
questions for future research. For example, how do the state and
strength processes identified here relate to processes underlying
unconscious perception/memory? The current experiments fo-
cused on separating state and strength processes as they contribute
to performance on conscious (or explicit) perception and memory
tasks. In studies of memory, familiarity is found to be related to
some forms of implicit memory (i.e. memory without awareness).
For example, both familiarity and conceptual implicit memory are
found to be influenced by similar experimental variables [4] and
they are both critically dependent on the perirhinal cortex [38].
Thus, in memory at least, it appears that familiarity and implicit
forms of memory may share similar underlying processes. Whether
this is true for knowing and unconscious perception is unknown,
but one might expect that the same neurocognitive processes
supporting knowing judgments might also support forms of
unconscious perception, possibly differing only in that knowing
responses might be stronger than manifestations of unconscious
perception. Future studies examining this possibility will be
important. A related question worth examining is whether there
may be unconscious perceptual processes that exhibit state-based
characteristics, or whether unconscious processes might necessarily
be strength based.
Finally, state-strength theory does not indicate how these two
types of processes arise and so computational models that specify
how state and strength signals can be derived will also be critical.
One possibility is that the determination of sameness or difference
depends on local sequential sampling and comparison of paired
stimuli. Perceiving difference might occur when the system
samples several identical features before sampling a large
difference between paired stimuli; this would result in a sudden
transition from information about ‘sameness’ to information about
‘difference’, and could be associated with access to specific local
details that differ between two stimuli. On the other hand,
knowing difference or sameness might occur when local sequential
sampling returns a small ‘different’ or ‘same’ signal on each
sample, and this signal accumulates gradually as more and more
features are sampled. This would result in gradual transitions in
which increasing evidence for ‘difference’ or ‘sameness’ is accrued
over time. This is only one of many potential mechanisms that
might underlie perceiving and knowing. The important point is
that the current data show evidence for two qualitatively different
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to detailed information, and another which grows gradually over
time and is associated with access to global matching information.
A successful computational model must be able to produce these
two distinct temporal onset patterns that are associated with access
to different kinds of information.
Conclusion
We propose that a general distinction in types of information
available to consciousness is useful for understanding phenomena
in both perception and memory. One type of information is a
result of relatively local access to high-resolution, qualitative
details, and is associated with a state of perceiving or of
recollection. Another type of information is characterized by
relatively global or low-resolution match signals, and is associated
with strengths of knowing or of familiarity. We speculate that this
single theoretical framework is useful in relating memory and
perception because both cognitive functions are dependent on
these common principles. Our findings suggest that the critical
question in cognition might not be whether a given experience is
‘perception’ or ‘memory’, is ‘conscious’ or ‘unconscious’, but
whether the mental experience is characterized by a discrete
mental state or a process that varies continuously in strength.
Methods
Ethics Statement
Treatment of all participants was in accordance with the ethical
standards of the American Psychological Association. Written
informed consent was obtained after the nature and possible
consequences of the study were explained. The studies were
approved by the University of California, Davis Institutional
Review Board.
Experiment 1 - Perceptual judgments of simple stimuli
Participants. Twenty two undergraduate students from the
University of California, Davis participated in the experiment for
credit in an introductory psychology course. All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Different sets of participants
from the same participant pool served in all the subsequent
experiments. Three participants were excluded for performing at
chance levels and one participant was excluded for not using the
confidence scale as instructed.
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The experiment
consisted of two blocks of 100 trials each. The stimuli were two
dark gray lines, each either vertical or horizontal, presented to the
left and right of a central fixation cross. Vertical and horizontal
lines appeared equally often in the left and right locations. Half of
the trials were ‘same’ trials, in which both lines were the same
orientation, and half were ‘different’ trials, in which one line of
each orientation was presented. Same and different trials were
presented in a random order. All trial types (i.e. two vertical, two
horizontal, vertical on left and horizontal on right, horizontal on
left and vertical on right) occurred equally often.
Each trial began with a 1500 ms centrally-presented fixation
cross. Two lines then appeared for 33 ms to the left and right of
fixation. Following an inter-stimulus interval of 0, 16, 33, 48, or
64 ms, two dynamic grid masks were presented for 33 ms over the
locations of the target lines. A confidence scale then appeared, and
individuals made a self-paced same/different judgment using a 1
(‘sure different’) to 6 (‘sure same’) confidence scale (Fig. 2A and
Movie S1). The scale was displayed on the screen while individuals
made the confidence response, and each point on the scale was
labeled (1=sure different, 2=maybe different, 3=guess different,
4=guess same, 5=maybe same, 6=sure same). The same
confidence scale was used in all the subsequent ROC studies
unless otherwise noted. Additionally, in this and all subsequent
studies, the scale was carefully explained to participants at the
beginning of the experiment, and they were encouraged to use all
six keys over the course of each block.
The ISI was determined before the experiment using a titration
procedure. The titration phase was used because pilot studies
showed that for any one study duration, some participants
performed perfectly while others were at chance. Five levels of
ISI were tested. Level 0 was 33 ms, and there were two levels
below and two levels above in steps of 16 ms (i.e. 0, 16, 33, 48, and
64 ms ISIs). Each participant started with a 20-trial titration block
at Level 0. Trial procedure was identical to the experimental
procedure described above, except that participants received
feedback on accuracy and cumulative accuracy on a trial-by-trial
basis. At the end of the 20 trials, if accuracy was between 65% and
75%, the participant repeated another 20-trial titration block with
the same ISI. If the participant fell above the 65%–75% range, the
titration block was repeated with the ISI one step below. If the
participant fell below the 65%–75% range, the titration phase was
repeated with the ISI one step above. Titration blocks were
repeated, in increasing or decreasing steps, until the participant
reached 65%–75% accuracy for two successive 20-trial blocks.
Once this occurred, the participant was started on the experi-
mental phase with an ISI one step below the one at which they
reached criterion (note that participants who reached criterion at
0 ms necessarily had a 0 ms ISI during the experiment). This
procedure ensured that performance was not at ceiling or at floor
for the experimental phase.
Data Analysis. Confidence ratings were used to plot receiver
operating characteristics (Fig. 1). The leftmost point corresponds to
the probability of a hit (y-axis) and false alarm (x-axis) for the most
confident ‘same’ response, and subsequent points are the
cumulative probabilities for the hits and false alarms with
responses of decreasing confidence. In this and all subsequent
ROC studies, the ROCs were fit to state-strength theory using a
nonlinear regression method that minimizes the sum of squared
errors (SSE) between the predicted function and observed data
points [3,17]. Maximum likelihood estimation on the aggregate
data led to comparable results as the SSE method in all
experiments, thus only the SSE results are reported.
Experiment 2A – Perceptual judgments of buildings,
faces and fractals
Participants. Eighteen participants took part in the
experiment. Four participants were excluded for using only two
of the six response keys.
Materials. Three types of materials were used: buildings,
faces, and fractals. One hundred and sixty of each stimulus type
served as experimental stimuli, and six of each stimulus type served
as practice stimuli. Colored photographs of buildings were
obtained from Internet searches. Face photographs were
grayscale, frontal images of males and females with neutral facial
expressions, which were cropped at the neck. The male faces were
found from Internet searches and from databases available
courtesy of Michael J. Tarr (Center for the Neural Basis of
Cognition and Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon
University, http://www.tarrlab.org/). The female faces were
obtained from the University of Texas at Dallas Center for Vital
Longevity face database [39]. The fractals were made using the
Tiera-Zon Fractal Generator freeware program.
For each stimulus, two altered versions were created in Adobe
Photoshop. The first version was expanded outward slightly using
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slightly using the ‘pinch’ option. Pilot studies were conducted to
find levels of distortion that led to equivalent levels of performance
(measured in d9) for the buildings, faces, and fractals.
Design and Procedure. The experiment was divided into
three blocks (buildings, faces, and fractals), with order of the blocks
counterbalanced across participants. Each block consisted of one
hundred and sixty trials. Eighty trials were ‘same’ trials in which
identical stimuli were presented (i.e. both pinched versions or both
spherized versions; these trial types occurred equally often). Eighty
trials were ‘different’ trials in which the two altered versions of a
stimulus were presented (i.e. the pinched version followed by the
spherized version, or vice versa; these trial types occurred equally
often). Pinched and spherized stimuli occurred equally frequently
as the first and second stimuli. Two stimuli lists were created so
that each stimulus was tested on both ‘same’ and ‘different’ trials
across participants. Same and different trials were presented in a
random order.
Participants were told that they would be presented with pairs of
very similar images, and had to judge if the two images were the
same or different. On each trial, participants viewed a ‘get ready’
screen for 1500 ms. This was followed by a building, face, or
fractal for 1500 ms, then a dynamic noise mask for 50 ms. The
dynamic mask consisted of three different noise masks presented
for 17 ms, 17 ms, and 16 ms. The corresponding identical (on
‘same’ trials) or alternate (on ‘different’ trials) version of the
stimulus was then presented, and participants gave a response
using a 1 (‘sure different’) to 6 (‘sure same’) scale to indicate their
confidence that the two stimuli were the same or different (see
Fig. 2B and Movie S2). Responses were self-paced and the second
stimulus and the response scale stayed on the screen until a
response was made.
Before the experiment, participants viewed sample buildings,
faces, and fractals on the computer. One pair of ‘same’ stimuli and
one pair of ‘different’ stimuli for each of the material types were
used as examples of the types of stimuli in the experiment.
Participants were encouraged to scroll through the images and
observe the differences between pairs of images, so that they knew
what types of changes to expect in the experiment. Participants
also completed a short (four trial) practice block, using the trial
procedure specified above, before each block of the experiment.
All participants completed all three blocks, with a short break in
between the blocks.
Experiment 2B – Sequential presentation with 0 delay
Participants. Eighteen participants took part in the
experiment, but one participant was excluded for using only two
of the six response keys.
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The materials, design,
and procedure were identical to Experiment 2A with the following
exceptions. The first stimulus was presented for 300 ms instead of
1500 ms, and the masks were removed so that there was no delay
between the first stimulus and the second stimulus (see Movie S3).
In order to prevent participants from using transient motion cues
to detect changed stimuli, the second stimulus was shifted slightly
to the right of the first stimulus, so that there was motion on both
‘same’ and ‘different’ trials.
Experiment 2C – Simultaneous Presentation
Participants. Nineteen participants took part in the
experiment, but three participants were excluded for using only
two of the six response keys.
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The materials, design,
and procedure were identical to Experiment 2A with the following
exceptions. The two stimuli were presented side by side, to the left
and right of fixation, for 1500 ms (see Movie S4), after which the
confidence scale appeared on the screen. Responding was self-
paced and the scale stayed on the screen until individuals made a
response, but the stimuli were not on the screen for the response.
Experiment 2D – Simultaneous Presentation for 180 ms
Participants. Eighteen participants took part in the
experiment, but three participants were excluded for using only
two of the six response keys.
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The materials, design,
and procedure were identical to Experiment 2C with the following
exceptions. Only the fractals were used, and the exposure duration
was reduced to 180 ms. The distortions to the fractals were
increased so that performance would not be at floor. The
distortions were made using the ‘pinch’ and ‘spherize’ options in
Photoshop, as in the previous experiments.
Experiment 2E – Sets of independent objects
Participants. Twenty nine participants took part in the
experiment, but two participants were excluded for using only two
of the six response keys.
Materials. Eight hundred photographs of objects were
obtained from the BOSS database [40], from databases
available courtesy of Michael J. Tarr (Center for the Neural
Basis of Cognition and Department of Psychology, Carnegie
Mellon University, http://www.tarrlab.org/), and from Internet
searches. All objects were on a white background and were
converted to grayscale and resized to 120 by 120 pixels using
Adobe Photoshop. Twenty of the objects were used in the
‘repeated’ condition, and the remaining seven hundred and eighty
were used in the ‘unique’ condition. An additional sixteen objects
were used for a five-trial practice block. The practice images ([41],
also courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, see above) were converted to
grayscale line drawings using the ‘photocopy’ command in Adobe
Photoshop. The practice images were chosen to be distinct from
the experimental images.
Design and Procedure. The experiment was divided into
two blocks, with a short practice phase at the beginning of the
experiment. The stimuli in the ‘repeated’ block were twenty
objects that were used repeatedly over the block in different
combinations of six on each trial. In the ‘unique’ block, the objects
were unique on every trial. Block order was counterbalanced
across participants. Each block consisted of sixty ‘same’ trials and
sixty ‘different’ trials, presented in a random order.
Participants were told that they would be presented with arrays
of objects, and they had to judge if the two arrays presented on a
trial were the same or different. They were told that the arrays
would either be exactly the same, or one object will be different.
On each trial, a fixation cross appeared in the center of the screen,
with six objects arranged around it (see Movie S5). This study
array was presented for 1000 ms, and then a dynamic noise mask
was presented for 50 ms at each of the six locations, followed by a
test array of six objects. On ‘same’ trials, the test array was
identical to the study array. On ‘different’ trials, one of the six
objects was replaced with a different object. Each of the six
locations was equally likely to change over the course of the
experiment. In the ‘repeated’ block, each stimulus was equally
likely to appear in each of the six locations and equally likely to
appear as the new stimulus on ‘different’ trials.
Participants used a 1 (‘sure different’) to 6 (‘sure same’) scale to
indicate their confidence that the two arrays were the same or
different. Responses were self-paced and the test array and
response scale stayed on the screen until a response was made.
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the block. An inter-trial interval of 1000 ms elapsed before the
next study array appeared. At the end of the block, participants
had a short break before completing the next block.
Experiment 3A – Global vs. discrete changes
Participants. Thirty eight participants took part in the
experiment, half in the ‘global change’ condition, and the other
half in the ‘discrete change’ condition.
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The one hundred and
sixty original (unaltered) building images from Experiment 2A
were used to create different changed versions for the ‘global
change’ and ‘discrete change’ conditions. Thus, the same original
images were used for the global and discrete change conditions but
different changes were made to the stimuli for the two conditions.
The global changes were the ‘pinch’ and ‘spherize’ distortions
from Adobe Photoshop, which were used in the earlier studies.
These options alter an image so that it is different over much of its
extent. For the discrete changes, using Adobe Photoshop, a change
was made to each building so that an element of the scene was
either added or removed (Fig. 3A). Since pilot studies indicated
that the discrete change condition was more difficult than the
global change conditions used in previous studies, the global
changes were more subtle in this experiment compared to what
had been used in the other studies.
Two stimuli lists were created so that each stimulus was tested on
both ‘same’ and ‘different’ trials across participants. Half of the trials
were ‘same’ and the other half were ‘different’, and these trials were
randomly presented. For the discrete change condition, the
unaltered original image was presented first on half of the trials,
and the changed version was presented first on the remaining half.
Half of the ‘same’ trials involved presentation of two original images
and the other half involved presentation of the two altered images.
Half of the ‘different’ trials involved presentation of the original
image first and the altered version second, and the other half
presented the altered image first and the original image second. The
same stimulus counterbalancing was used for the global change
condition except that the ‘spherized’ and ‘pinched’ buildings were
usedinplaceoftheunalteredoriginalsanddiscretechangebuildings.
The trial procedure was identical to Experiment 2A (Fig. 2B
and Movie S2). On each trial, participants viewed a ‘get ready’
screen for 1500 ms. This was followed by a building for 1500 ms,
which was then masked for 50 ms. The corresponding identical
(on ‘same’ trials) or alternate (on ‘different’ trials) version of the
stimulus was then presented, and participants gave a response
using a 1 (‘sure different’) to 6 (‘sure same’) scale to indicate their
confidence that the two stimuli were the same or different.
Responses were self-paced and the second stimulus and the
response scale stayed on the screen until a response was made.
Before the experiment, participants viewed four pairs of sample
buildings on the computer. The same original building images were
used to create different changed versions for the global and discrete
change conditions. For the global change condition, a ‘pinched’ and
‘spherized’ version of each building were viewed. For the discrete
change condition, the original building and an altered version of the
building (i.e. something was added or removed) were viewed.
Participants were encouraged to scroll through the images and
observe the differences between pairs of images, so that they knew
what types of changes to expect in the experiment. Participants also
completed a short (four trial) practice block before the experiment,
using the trial procedure specified above.
Data Analysis. Since different groups of individuals were
tested in the global and discrete change conditions, statistical tests
were independent-samples t-tests, with n=19 in each of two
groups. The alpha level was 0.017, two-tailed. This alpha level was
chosen based on the Bonferroni correction (i.e. p=.05/3
comparisons of interest, for Ps, Pd, and K). Exact p-values are
reported in the paper.
zROCs were obtained by converting the probability ROC
points to z-scores, and plotting the ROCs in z-space. The z-ROC
quadratic analyses were one-sample t-tests, used to determine if the
quadratic coefficients were significantly different from zero. The
alpha level was 0.05, two-tailed, for each test.
In this and all subsequent experiments, the data were checked for
normality using the Shapiro-Wilk normality test. Since normality is
difficult to accurately assess with small samples, in all cases we also
analyzed the data with the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test.
In no case were the results of the statistical tests altered, so we report
parametric tests in the paper.
Experiment 3B - Assessing state and strength processes
using a flicker paradigm
Participants. Twenty participants took part in the
experiment, half in the ‘global change’ condition, and the other
half in the ‘discrete change’ condition.
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The materials were
identical to Experiment 3A. Participants took part in either the
discrete change condition or the global change condition. Two
stimuli lists per condition were again used, divided equally among
the participants. As in Experiment 3A, participants viewed sample
buildings before beginning the experiment. Each participant
completed 160 trials (80 different and 80 same), with 10 responses
per trial.
The trial procedure was a modification of the flicker paradigm
used in change-detection studies [6]. A trial consisted of 10
repetitions of the following sequence: an image for 150 ms, a black
screen for 80 ms, the corresponding ‘same’ or ‘different’ image for
150 ms, and, finally, a 9-point confidence scale for a self-paced
same/different judgment (Movie S6). Following the 10 repetitions,
the next trial began, using the same procedure.
For the confidence judgment, participants were told to use the
four fingers on their left hand for ‘different’ responses, the four
fingers on their right hand for ‘same’ responses, and the spacebar
for ‘I don’t know.’ The keys a, s, d, and f were used for ‘sure
different’, ‘maybe different’, ‘slight chance difference’, and ‘guess
different’, respectively. The keys l, k, j, and h were used for ‘sure
same’, ‘maybe same’, ‘slight chance same’, and ‘guess same’,
respectively. The scale and the corresponding keys were displayed
on the screen while individuals made the confidence response (i.e.
‘a’ was labeled as ‘sure different’ and so on).
Data Analysis. Confidence ratings were re-coded so that 1,
2, 3, and 4 indicated increasing levels of confidence that a pair was
different, and 21, 22, 23, and 24 indicated increasing levels of
confidence that a pair was the same. ‘I don’t know’ responses were
coded as 0.
To examine how correct high-confidence responses appeared
over time, each trial was classified as either a ‘step function’ trial or
a ‘gradual transition’ trial depending on how the transition to the
highest-confidence correct response arose. Trials that did not end
on the highest-confidence correct response were not used in this
analysis. Confidence transitions of one step were defined as
‘gradual’ (i.e. from ‘3’ to ‘4’ for ‘different’ trials and from ‘23’ to
‘24’ for ‘same trials). Confidence transitions of two steps or greater
were defined as ‘step functions’. The proportion of step function
and gradual transition ‘different’ and ‘same’ trials were calculated
for each participant by dividing the number of those trials by the
total number of trials in that condition. Planned comparisons were
carried out on the proportions (see main text). To ensure that the
Bridging Consciousness and Cognition
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 13 January 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | e30231results did not depend on using raw proportions, the data were
also examined in two other ways. First, the occurrence of gradual
transitions was calculated conditional on a step function transition
not occurring. Second, the raw proportions were corrected for
false alarms by subtracting the proportion of incorrect responses
(e.g. subtracting the proportion of incorrect gradual transitions on
‘same’ trials from the proportion of correct gradual transitions on
‘different’ trials). The results of the statistical tests were not affected
by which of these methods was used.
Since different groups of individuals were tested in the global
and discrete change conditions, transition analyses were conducted
using independent-samples t-tests when comparing global and
discrete conditions (n=10 in each of the two groups), and paired-
samples t-tests when comparing ‘same’ and ‘different’ trials within
the global and discrete conditions. The alpha level for the two
between-groups comparisons was 0.025, two-tailed, using the
Bonferroni correction for two comparisons. The alpha level for
each within-group comparison was 0.05, two-tailed (i.e. one
comparison for each group). Exact p-values are reported in the
paper.
The correlation analysis examined the relationship between step
function transitions and perceiving, and between gradual transitions
and knowing. The second response in each series of ten repetitions
was used because it was the first response that avoided floor effects.
Step function and gradual transition trials were defined as above,
except that gradual transition trials also included correct ‘different’
responses made with lower confidence (i.e. 1s, 2s, and 3s).
Proportions of step function transitions and conditional proportions
of gradual transitions (see above) were used in the correlation
analyses. False alarm rates were corrected for as described above.
Estimates of Pd, Ps, and K were obtained from the ROCs on the
second response. K was converted to a probability so as to be on the
same scale as the other estimates. To convert the d9 value to a
probability, each individual’s false ‘different’ rate (i.e. 1–4 responses
on ‘same’ trials) was used to find the hit rate that would yield that d9
value. The false alarm rate was then subtracted from the hit rate to
yield an estimate of K as a probability. Probabilities of Pd and K
were then correlated with probabilities of step function and gradual
transition trials as described above.
The z-ROC quadratic analyses (Fig. 3C) were one-sample t-tests,
used to determine if the quadratic coefficients were significantly
different from zero. The alpha level was 0.05, two-tailed, for each
test.
Additional Analyses. Since the proportion of trials showing
gradual transitions must decrease as the proportion of trials
showing step function transitions increases, a difference in the
proportion of gradual transitions between the discrete and global
conditions may be observed if they differed in the occurrence of
step function transitions. To verify that the difference in gradual
transitions is a true difference, we examined the conditional
probabilities of gradual transitions, given that step function
transitions did not occur. Global changes were still associated
with more gradual transitions than discrete changes, and if
anything, this difference was magnified in the conditional
proportions [14(5)% and 62(11)% of ‘different’ trials for discrete
and global changes, respectively, t(18)=3.96, p,.001].
Step function transitions in the flicker data analyses were
defined arbitrarily as transitions of two steps or greater. In order to
precisely quantify step function transitions, we examined the
average step size for transitions greater than one step (note:
transitions of one step in confidence are the minimum that must be
reserved to define ‘gradual transitions’, so we examined the size of
all other transitions). Specifically, we examined the jump in
confidence points from the response preceding the highest-
confidence correct response (i.e. a ‘4’ for ‘different’ trials) to that
final high-confidence response. For example, a transition from ‘0’
to ‘4’ would be a step of size four, a transition from ‘21’ to ‘4’
would be a step of size five, and so on. The average size of step
function transitions was M=4.43, SE=0.13 for discrete changes
and M=3.76, SE=.21 for global changes. This suggests that using
transitions of two steps or greater to define ‘step functions’, while
arbitrary, would not have led to different results than choosing
steps of size three or four. Choosing transitions of step size four
may have slightly reduced the number of step function transitions
for the global change condition, but this would only magnify the
difference between conditions in the predicted direction.
Experiment 4A - Subjective reports of perceiving and
knowing
Participants. Twenty seven participants took part in the
experiment, but three participants were excluded for chance
performance.
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The materials were the
discrete change buildings materials from Experiment 3. These
materials were chosen because the discrete changes were most
amenable to the qualitative, verbal descriptions required to justify
‘perceive’ responses.
The perceive/know instructions were explained in detail to the
participants. Participants were told to give a perceive response if they
had an experience of consciously perceiving the images as being
either different or exactly the same and were able to tell the
experimenter specific details about how the images were either
different or the same. They were told to only give this response if
they perceived specific details about how the images were either
different or the same. For the example shown in Fig. 3A, a
justification of a ‘perceive different’ response could be, ‘There used
to be a lamp by the windowsill, and then it was gone’.
Participants were instructed to give a know response if they just
knew that the images were either different or the same, but were
not able to provide specific details about why they thought the
images were either different or the same. It was emphasized that
they could be very confident that the images were different or the
same, but if they could not give specific details about how the
images were different or the same, they should give a ‘know’
response.
Before the experiment, participants viewed four pairs of sample
buildings. The pairs consisted of a building and an altered version
of that building (i.e. something was added or removed).
Participants were encouraged to scroll through the images and
observe the differences between pairs of images, so that they knew
what types of changes to expect in the experiment. Participants
then completed a short (four trial) practice block. After the practice
block, each participant was asked to justify the perceive/know
response that they had given on the last practice trial. Acceptable
answers for ‘perceive’ judgments were those that included
descriptions of specific details about how the images were the
same or different. Acceptable answers for ‘know’ judgments were
those in which a participant expressed that the images seemed
either the same or different but could not provide specific details
about why. If a participant did not fully understand the
instructions, as evidenced by their responses, the instructions were
repeated to ensure that the distinction between perceive and know
was understood.
Data Analysis. Confidence data were used to plot ROCs as
in previous experiments. Ps, Pd, and K were estimated from the
perceive/know responses based on a modification of the
Independence Remember/Know (IRK) procedure in long-term
memory research [42]. Ps and Pd were estimated the same way
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Ps~p(
00Ps same trial){p(
00Ps00 different trial) j j
Pd~p(
00Pd00 different trial){p(
00Pd00 same trial) j j
K was estimated in a similar way as familiarity is estimated, that is,
conditional on Ps and Pd not occurring. The K probability was
converted to a d9 score using the inverse of the standard normal
cumulative distribution (i.e. ‘normsinv’ in the equation below), and
subtracting false alarms from hits.
Khits~
p(Kd different trial) j
1{p(Ps different trial){p(Pd different trial) j j ½ 
Kfalse alarms~
p(Kd same trial) j
1{p(Ps same trial){p(Pd same trial) j j ½ 
K(d0)~normsinv(Khits){normsinv(Kfalse alarms)
Experiment 4B – Verifying the basis of subjective reports
Participants. Twenty participants took part in the experiment.
Materials, Design, and Procedure. The materials, design,
and procedure were identical to Experiment 4A, except that
participants additionally gave a detail report following each
‘perceive different’ or ‘know different’ response to indicate the
basis for their response. For example, a participant may give a
‘perceive different’ response and follow that with a detail report in
which they describe a window disappearing from the front of a
house. Alternatively, a participant may give a ‘know different’
response and follow that with a report of just ‘knowing’ that the
images were different but not being able to provide a specific
reason why. Participants gave a verbal response on each trial,
which was recorded by the experimenter.
Data Analysis. The confidence responses were analyzed as in
the previous experiments. Perceive and know estimates from the
subjective reportswereobtained as in Experiment 4A. For eachpair
ofimages,twoscorers(M.A.anda researchassistant),wrote detailed
descriptions of the specific aspect of the image that changed from
the original to the altered version of the image. These descriptions
were refined until both scorers agreed on the wording.
To score the detail reports, the transcribed report of the
participant was compared to the written descriptions. When the
report matched the specific detail that had changed, the response
was scored as a ‘correct detail’. When the report was of another
(unaltered) detail in the image, one that did not match the actual
changed detail, the response was scored as an ‘incorrect detail’.
Reports in which no specific detail was reported were scored as ‘no
detail’. The scorers were always able to reach agreement in
situations where there was an initial discrepancy in the scoring.
Experiment 5A – Standard long-term recognition
memory
Participants. Thirty six participants took part in the
experiment, but two participants were excluded for performing
at chance levels.
Materials. The materials were the one hundred and sixty
buildings used in Experiments2A–Cand one hundrednew buildings
foundfromInternetsearches.Halfofthebuildingswerealteredusing
the ‘pinch’ option in Adobe Photoshop, and the other half were
altered using the ‘spherize’ option, as inthe earlier experiments. Two
stimuli lists were created so that each stimulus was tested on both
‘same’ and ‘different’ trials across participants. ‘Same’ and ‘different’
trials were presented in a random order. The one hundred new
buildings were used as lures in the recognition memory test.
Design and Procedure. The first block was identical to the
buildings block in Experiment 2A, and served as an incidental
encoding phase for a subsequent surprise long-term recognition
memory test. One hundred buildings from the same/different task
were randomly selected and mixed with one hundred new buildings
for a recognition test. Half of the old and half of the new buildings
were ‘pinched’, and the remaining half of the old and new buildings
were ‘spherized’, so that participants could not use these distortions
as a basis for recognition judgments. Participants viewed each
building one at a time and rated their confidence that the building
had been seen as part of the same/different task, using a 1 (‘sure
new’) to 6 (‘sure old’) scale. Each building and the confidence scale
stayed on the screen until the participant made a response.
Experiment 5B – Long-term memory change detection
Participants. Twenty one participants took part in the
experiment, but one participant was excluded for performing at
chance.
Materials. One hundred and twenty color photographs of
complex indoor and outdoor scenes were collected from Internet
searches and an online database ([43], courtesy of Michael J. Tarr,
Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition and Department of
Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, http://www.tarrlab.org/).
The scenes were selected so that they contained many elements that
could potentially change. For each scene, a changed version was
created in Adobe Photoshop, where multiple elements of the scene
were altered by either adding or removing objects.
Design and Procedure. The experiment was divided into
twelve study-test blocks. Each block consisted of ten scenes in the
study phase and all ten in the test phase. Half of the images at test
were identical to the studied image, and half were different. Of the
‘same’ trials, half consisted of the presentation of both original
images, andhalfconsisted of the presentationofboth altered images.
Half of the ‘different’ trials were ‘additions’, in which some elements
were added to the scene which were not present at study. The
remainder of the ‘different’ trials were ‘deletions’, in which some
elements of the studied scene were removed in the test scene. Half of
the studied images were the original images, and the other half were
the changed images. Half of the tested images were the original
images, and the other half were the changed images. This ensured
that participants could not identify images as different by looking for
cues that the image was edited in Photoshop. Two stimuli lists were
created so that each stimulus was tested on both ‘same’ and
‘different’ trials across participants. ‘Same’ and ‘different’ trials were
presented in a random order.
For each of the twelve study-test blocks, participants studied ten
scenes for seven seconds each, and were instructed to study each
scene carefully for a subsequent memory test (see Movie S7). The
test consisted of all ten scenes presented in a random order. For
each scene, participants responded using a 1 (‘sure different’) to 6
(‘sure same’) scale to indicate if the image was exactly the same as
the one they had studied, or was different in any way. The scale
and the scene stayed on the screen until a response was made.
Before the experiment, participants viewed three pairs of sample
images. The pairs consisted of a scene and an altered version of
that scene, wherein some elements had been added or removed.
Participants were encouraged to scroll through the scenes and
observe the differences between pairs of scenes, so that they knew
what types of changes to expect in the experiment.
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independent-samples t-tests, with n=34 in the standard long-term
recognition condition and n=20 in the long-term memory change
detection condition. The alpha level was 0.017 for two-tailed
comparisons, based on the Bonferroni correction (i.e. p=.05/3
comparisons of interest, for Ro, Rn, and F).
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